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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
PROVO CITY, a municipal cor- · • _ 
poration of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff & Respondent, 
vs. ,, 
HUBERT C. L»>BE;RT, State. · _.:J., - ·· 
Engineer of the State o-f-· , ': ,. 
Utah~ PROVO RIVER WATER USE~.· 
ASSOCIATION, a corporat;.),:Ont: · : 
KEJNNECOTT COPPER CORPOIWnOii 1 
a corporation~ SALT I.AKE CI'f!',: 
a municipal corporation, 
CENTRAL UTAH WATER CONSER- ·. : 
VANCY DISTRICT~ UTAH LAKE, DIB- ~ 
TRIBUTING COMPANY, a (lQ~. 'j 
tion~ UNITED STATES. OF Jl-..... ~ .·.\ .. 
BUREAU OF RECI.AMAT'l:OI'Iil 1 ~ · • 
l-iENT OF THE ;rnEJdcmr !lt;Je·>_·J · ,,., 
McKELLAR, a"· Proiro IUvar· ~+ 
missioner'j a.nd novo use- . ' 
VOIR WATER OSEJIS ~y r'. a: · .. 
corporation, 
Defendants & Appellaa~s~. 
AN APPEAL FROM THB 
JOSEPH NOVAK 
COURT, IN AXD 
HONORABLE 'DON V. 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Appellants Provo River Water 
Users Association, Utah Lake 
Distributing Company and Provo 
Reservoir Water Users Company 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY, a municipal cor-
poration of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff & Respondent, 
vs. 
HUBERT C. LAMBERT, State 
Engineer of the State of 
Utah; PROVO RIVER WATER USERS 
ASSOCIATION, a corporation; 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, 
a corporation; SALT LAKE CITY,: 
a municipal corporation, 
CENTRAL UTAH \•TATER CONSER-
VANCY DISTRICT; UTAH LAKE DIS-
TRIBUTING COMPANY, a corpora- : 
tion; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, DEPART-: 
MENT OF THE INTERIOR; HUGH 
McKELLAR, as Provo River Com-
missioner; and PROVO RESER-
VOIR WATER USERS COHPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants & Appellants. 
CASE NO. 14,605 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEHENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to review in its entirety, and not in 
part as the appellants have stated, the decision of the 
State Engineer relative to Provo City's right to water under 
paragraph 4(c) of the "Provo River Decree" of May 2, 1921. 
The general characterization by the appellants under this 
heading is erroneous. 
DISPOSITION BY STATE ENGINEER 
While this particular subdivision (Disposition by State 
Engineer) is not prescribed for briefs by the Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure, the respondent has no objection to such 
discussion, except that the facts should be reported ac-
curately. The corrected facts are: 
--
1. In September, 1969, appellant Hugh A. McKellar, 
then Provo River Water Commissioner, unilaterally, ex parte, 
sua sponte and without authority, made the unprecedented 
determination that Provo City's right to 16.5 c.f.s. under 
the Morse Decree of May 2, 1~21, was a non-consumptive right 
and, accordingly refused to deliver such water to Provo 
City. 
2. Representatives of Provo City attempted to reason 
with Mr. McKellar, but their efforts were to no avail. 
3. Mr. Richard Maxfield, then special counsel for 
Provo City, called the State Engineer's office and talked 
with Mr. Bryce Montgomery, who was acting State Engineer 
during the illness of Mr. Lambert. After reviewing the 
record, Mr. r.fontgomery wrote f.lr. McKellar on September 19, 
1969, and told him to redivert the 16.5 c.f.s. to Provo 
City. (Ex. 21). 
4. Mr. McKellar notified Mr. Mendenhall, manager of 
the Provo Reservoir Water Users Company, of the decision. 
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Joseph Novak filed an objection wiili 
the State Engineer. This objection developed into a legalis-
tic hearing involving the interpretation of paragraph 4(c) 
of the Decree. 
5. On May 1, 1970, the State Engineer rendered his 
decision, holding that paragraph 4(c) of the Provo River 
-2-
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Decree was for non-consumptive power use only. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In the first disposition before the Honorable Allen B. 
Sorenson, the matter was presented on motions for summary 
judgment made by each side. No testimony was taken. The 
defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted. On 
remand, the Trial Court found in favor of the plaintiff-
respondent. 
The balance of the appellants' chronology concerning 
the disposition in the lower court is substantially correct. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have the judgment of the lower 
court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants commence their statement of fact by 
stating that they will "strive to comply with the time-
honored rules of appellee (sic) review and state those facts 
in the light most favorable to the Amended Findings of Fact 
and Amended Judgment below". After such a lofty pronounce-
ment of purpose, the appellants then proceed to ignore 
salient evidence and testimony and to tailor the facts to 
their liking. For that reason, the respondent must make the 
following and somewhat lengthy restatement of facts. 
On August 7, 1972, this Court remanded the cause to the 
Trial Court with this language: 
"It is therefore ordered that this matter be 
remanded to the District Court with the recom-
mendation that the court refer the matter 
-3-
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to the State Engineer for a determination 
from the historical or other data, or from 
other investigation as to the use, if any, 
made of the water here in question." (R. 
217A). 
On September 22, 1972, the trial Court ordered the case 
referred to the State Engineer for "such determination as 
may be helpful in liew (sic) of the decision of the Supreme 
Court." The Court obviously intended the word "light" 
instead of "lieu". 
Mr. Hubert c. Lambert, the previous engineer died on 
March 5, 1973 and thereafter, on May 1, 1973, Mr. Dee c. 
Hansen was appointed State Engineer. 
After some prodding by Provo City, Mr. Hansen, the 
State Engineer, conducted a hearing. The hearing took 
approximately a day and a half, the first day being January 
8, 1975, and the second January 18, 1975. He thereafter 
rendered his report. That report is undated and unsigned 
but it was filed with the clerk of the court on June 18, 
1975. 
Provo City has the following observations, additions, 
and corrections to the appellants' Statement of Facts, 
taking the "facts" up in the order in which the appellants 
have set them forth: 
A. General Statement re: Geographical Locations. 
Provo City does not object to appellants' general 
statement of facts under this heading: 
B. Statement of Facts From Record of Civil ~ 
~ Before this Court on Prior Appeal. 
-4-
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The difficulty with stating the facts in this manner is 
that there was no record of testimony and evidence on the 
prior appeal. Further, by stating the so called facts this 
way, the appellants can be truthful to the extent of the 
"then" record, even though such "truth" is different than 
the facts considered by the trial court. It is essential, 
therefore, that the salient facts (those considered by Judge 
Tibbs) be considered along side the appellants' assumed 
facts from Judge Sorenson's abbreviated record. 
Contrary to the appellants' assertion that "no one 
knows exactly how much acreage was irrigated by 4(c) water 
in 1921", it does appear that there were hundreds of acres 
irrigated by 4(c) water. For example, there were a number 
of blocks on both sides of the factory race, (R. 973), on 
the Third West diversion (R. 973), and blocks and open 
acreage south of Sixth South (Railroad Street) from Fifth 
West on the west to the arc made by the railroad track 
running east and circling to the southeast and from this 
west, north and east parameter south to Utah Lake, that were 
irrigated by 4(c) water. This area, however, excluded part 
of the First Ward Pasture, which had a separate water right 
under the Provo River Decree. The line to the south fluctua-
ted because of the level of the lake; and sometimes hundreds 
of acres south of the meander line were amenable to irrigation 
(R. 967). The city engineer, Hr. Zirbes, calculated the 
number of acres amendable to irrigation in 1921 by use of 
the 4(c) water to the Utah Lake meander line to be not less 
-5-
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than 1407.87 acres. (R. 1270, Ex. 20). The total 
acreage irrigated by rights under 4(a) (b) and (c) was 
4,758 acres. (R. 1270-1275, Ex. 20). 
The interim decision of Judge Horse on November 26, 
1917, is not material here for it was superseded by the 
decree of May 2, 1921. The asserted facts set forth on 
pages 11, 12 and 13 of the appellants' brief are simply not 
facts. They were merely 1917 pre-trial stipulations which 
were substantially changed by the Decree of 1921. Cer-
tainly, there were some similarities between the stipulations 
and the final decree but the appellants would be clairvoyant 
to be able to say they were incorporated as such, sans 
evidence and testimony, into the Provo River Decree. 
C. Statement of Facts Found £Y_ State Engineer 
Pursuant to Referral from District Court. 
- --
Provo City protests this entire category of "facts" for 
a number of reasons. In the first place, it is an attempt 
to masquerade as facts erroneous conclusions of the State 
Engineer. It isn't his "facts" that were found and from 
which the appellants appeal, but rather those contained in 
the Findings of Fact of the trial judge. The Court, in its 
Findings, found the State Engineer's report to be erroneous 
in many particulars, among which were: the number of acres 
irrigated under the 4(c) right; the number of acres 
irrigated out of the factory race; and the dates the manu-
facturing mills stopped using the strean for power. (See 
Findings of Fact, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 
-6-
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20, 21, and 22). 
The appellants prefer to ignore the evidence that is 
contrary to the State Engineer's Report. In particular, 
the court found all of the facts stated on page 13, 14 and 
15 or appellants' brief under this heading, to be erroneous. 
In light of the fact that the engineer had this matter under 
investigation for nearly three years and conducted only a 
cursory hearing, it would seem pretentious to postulate 
that his conclusions concerning the "facts" make such con-
clusions "facts". 
To quote "facts" which the court found to be erroneous 
and against the weight of the evidence is not a "Statement 
of Fact" no matter what title is attached. 
The entire representation under this heading is con-
trary to the believable facts presented at trial and, there-
fore, should be ignored. 
D. Statement of Facts from Evidentiary Hearing in 
District Court on the Use of the ~ Here in Question. 
Section 73-3~15, U.C.A. (1953), provides for a trial de 
novo in the district court to review decisions of the state 
engineer. If the appeal to the District Court gives the 
appellant a trial de novo , this subsection of appellant's 
"Statement of Facts" should be the only statement of facts 
to be considered. 
Addressing ourselves to the facts before the Trial 
Court, the respondent would add the following: 
Both the State Engineer and the Provo City Water 
-7-
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Department and Provo City Engineer attempted to identify the 
number of acres irrigated by Provo City's 4(c) water. The 
calculation methods used were different. The State Engineer 
attempted, by the use of a 1937 Provo City map,to work 
backwards by identifying service ditches and then calculating 
the acreages to be served by such laterals. At best, his 
estimates were interpolations and speculations. 
Contrasted to the State Engineer's technique, Provo 
City produced a variety of witnesses, to wit: Dean Wheadon, 
(R. 967), the transcript of Henry J. W. Goddard, George c. 
Swan, Thomas E. Thompson. T. F. Wentz, Oscar w. Thayre, (See 
Exhibit 2), Earl J. Stubbs, (R. 1005), Leon Stubbs, (R. 
1048), Elmer M. Roberts, (R. 1054) Judge naurice Harding (R. 
1060), RobertS. worwood, (R. 1114), John w. Goddard, (R. 
1135), Grants. Larsen (R. 1149) and Stanley A. Roberts, 
(R. 1151), all of whom testified from actual knowledge of 
the land irrigated by Provo City from the Factory Race. 
From the testimony of the above named witnesses, coupled 
with the testimony of Mr. Dean Wheadon, Director of Provo 
City's Water Department and the testimony of Mr. Jack 
Zirbes, Provo City Engineer, the evidence most favorable to 
the city was that 4(c) water was used to irrigate a minimum 
of 1,407.87 acres plus hundreds of acres of accretion ground 
when the lake \~as belO\~ compromise. (R. 1270, Ex. 18 and 
20) (F. of F. 19 and 20). These facts are contrary to the 
appellants' assertion that the acreage irrigated by the 
Factory Race was not identified. 
-8-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Factory Race water was always used for irrigation. 
Before the last mill went off stream in February, 1931, the 
irrigation requirements of Provo City were sometimes ful-
filled by putting the entire stream in other canals at 
night in order to supply power water from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 
p.m., Mondays through Fridays. (R. 1154). That same power 
water, when it passed the last mill, was utilized to water 
the acreage south of Sixth South, as generally described on 
pages 5 and 6 above. None of the water was wasted. 
The fact is, further, that the above arrangement was 
not an exchange but rather an accommodation of the power 
needs by the owners of the irrigation water. (R~ 1182, Ex. 
9). The right of the mill owners was by license from Provo 
City, which did not own or operate one power· plant on the 
Factory Race. The assertion by the appellants that the 
factory race water was only used for irrigation at night is 
untrue. (Appellants' brief, p. 13). The evidence clearly 
shows that all of the 4(c) water was used for irrigation, 
whether diverted in the City Race, the East Union Canal or 
sent down the Factory Race. Only in periods of low water 
was the night time and weekend accomodation utilized. These 
facts are contrary to the appellants' assertion that power 
water was exchanged for irrigation water. 
The mills which used the Factory Race water for power 
purposes began to shut down in 1921 when E. J. Ward & Sons 
went off stream and continued to February, 1930, when 
Excelsor Roller Mills ceased to operate. (R. 1246). 
-9-
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In respect to Exhibits 14, 15(a) (b) and (c) the 
appellants' statements concerning what the graphs represent 
is generally correct except for a few vital particulars. 
These are: 
1. The black line represents that portion of the water 
shown by the red line which was actually diverted into the 
Factory Race, vis a vis, Tanner Race. (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 19). 
2. Whenever the total water available, (red line) was 
insufficient to meet Provo City's 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) right, 
the distribution was made proportionately. (Ex. 14). By 
use of Exhibits 15(a), (b) and (c), one can see that Provo 
City always had a proportionate amount of 4(c) water in the 
total water diverted. 
3. The hydrographic study, Exhibit 14, commences for 
the year 1930. By way of example, for the year 1930 it 
shows, commencing July 1, 1930, that the water master only 
put 5 c.f.s. down the Factory Race and on August 1st, he 
reduced it to 2 c.f.s. The stream was not used at all for 
power thereafter. 
4. Every year recorded on Exhibit 14 shows that very 
little of the 4(c) water was put down the Factory Race for 
power purposes. (Black line). 
5. The 4(c) water, although delivered as reflected on 
Exhibit 14, except for April, May and June of 1930, has 
thereafter, until ~ugust of 1969, been used exclusively for 
irrigation purposes. 
-10-
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Returning to the appellants' assertion that in 1937-
1938 the total acreage under the Provo City canal system was 
2,303.38 acres (R. 1381, 82), the respondent asserts that 
this alleged fact is based upon the State Engineer's at-
tempted reconstruction of the city system. This conclusion 
was not a fact, and, if it were, it would be irrelevant and 
i~~aterial for, at best, it shows his mathematics projected 
on what he reconstructed the canal system to be in 1938. 
The map itself, Exhibit "E", did not show the canal system 
and he, the State Engineer, had to develop it by extrapola-
tion. He admitted that he had to do it this way because he 
claimed that the earliest map he could obtain was a 1937 
map. (It should be noted that Ex. 19 is a 1921 map of 
Provo.) 
The appellants' statement that the Provo City canal 
system in 1937-1938 would serve 2,303.38 acres ignores 
believable evidence to the contrary. The State Engineer in 
his computations on Exhibit "E" left out hundreds of acres 
of land south of Sixth South which were generally shown to 
be irrigated on Provo City's Exhibit 3 and on Exhibit 18. 
(R. 967, 1263). The respondent's evidence demonstrated 
that there was substantially more acreage irrigated by the 
canal system in 1937-1938. 
Because the amount of acreage irrigated under Provo 
City's canal system in 1938 was immaterial to the issues 
before the court, Provo City did not develop engineering 
data on that subject. There was substantial reason to dis-
-11-
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believe the State Engineer's measurenents based upon his 
own testimony. To attempt to establish this conclusion of 
the engineer as a fact is to mislead this Court as to the 
"facts" of this case. 
The appellants on page 10, under their statement of 
facts, argue that, based on the Engineer's 1975 interpolated 
reconstruction by use of a 1937 city map converted to 1921, 
that the duty on 4(c) water would be 8.76 acres per acre 
foot. To the contrary, Provo City established by its 
engineer, Mr. Zirbes, that the duty for 4(c) water based on 
the minimum acreage to be watered, would be 85.3 acres per 
acre foot. (Ex. 20, R. 1275). 
Facts that are material but which have not been 
by the appellants are: 
This Court in its remand was concerned with the 
pr•mt.d I 
question of whether the 4(c) water was part of, or in 
addition to, the 4(a) and 4(b) water. All of the parties 
agree and have stipulated that the 4(c) water is in addition 
to the 4(a) and 4(b) rights. (R. 946). 
Appellant Hugh H. f·lcKellar was Provo River vlater 
Commissioner in 1969. In 1971, he was appointed Superin-
tendent of the principal appellant, Provo River Water Users 
Association, at twice his previous salary. (R. 869). His 
present employer was a principal beneficiary of his decision 
to take Provo City's water. (R. 875). 
Mr. McKellar, unilaterally and without instruction from 
his superiors, interpreted the Provo River Decree and deter-
-12-
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mined that the 4(c) right was a non-consumptive right and 
he, therefore, of his own initiative shut off the water. 
(R. 946, 947, 948). He did this notwithstanding the fact 
that all of his predecessors for forty-nine previous years 
had interpreted the Decree to the contrary. (R. 945). 
Mr. T. F. Wentz was Provo River Commissioner from 1912 
to 1954. (R. 919). He was a principal witness in the Provo 
River trial which lasted from 1912 to 1921 and resulted in 
the Provo River Decree of May 2, 1921. (R. 914). Mr. Wentz 
died in 1954 and was succeeded by Mr. Marion Clark who 
served from 1954 to 1958. Mr. Clark resigned and was fol-
lowed by !1r. \Val lace Wayman. Upon 11r. Wayman's death in 
1968, he was succeedded by Mr. McKellar. 
All of the Water Commissioners except Mr. McKellar 
recognized the 4(c) right as a consumptive right for irri-
gation and delivered the 4(c) water to Provo City accor-
dingly. This was done for each year from 1921 through the 
irrigation season of 1969, a period a few months short of 
fifty years. 
All of the persons who had personal knowledge of the 
right in 1921 are dead. 
Mr. Marion Clark, age 63 (R. 1085), who immediately 
followed Mr. Wentz said that he was personally close to Mr. 
Wentz from the time he was in the eighth grade. (R. 1107). 
He knew of his work concerning the river. (R. 764, 1108). 
He stated that he had delivered Mr. Wentz's records, in-
cluding flow and distribution records to Mr. Wayman, his 
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successor. (R. 748). He stated he had read and was 
personally familiar with the Provo River Decree. (R. 749, 
1086, 1108). His flow sheet (Exhibit 8) was received in 
evidence. (R. 1087, 1088, 1089). The entire 16.5 c.f.s. 
(4(c) water) was delivered to Provo City during his term and 
those of his predecessors from 1921 through 1950 for irri-
gation purposes. (R. 751). 
Mr. Clark stated that Mr. Wentz' handwritten records 
were turned over by him to Hr. Wayman, his successor. He 
stated that these documents supported his conclusions. (R. 
754). Mr. Clark has tried to locate these but finds that "a 
great deal of information had been removed from the files". 
(R. 755, 1092). The missing records were data sheets which 
Mr. Wentz had accumulated for Judge Morse (R. 751), and the 
documents supported his (Clark's) and Wentz' determination 
that 4(c) was an independent irrigation right. (R. 1094, 
109 5) • 
The Court took judicial notice of the Provo River 
Commissioners' published reports for the period of 1921 
through 1969, a period of 50 years, which show delivery of 
4(c) water (16.5 c.f.s.) to Provo City for irrigation pur-
poses. (R. 751). 
The Court received as evidence, Exhibit 1 (R. 958), 
Provo City's underlying application for the 4(c) water, 
which applications pre-dated the Decree. The water that was 
confirmed in Provo City by the Provo River Decree, Provision 
4(c), was corroborated by this application which states as 
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follows: 
"B. The water has been used for the following 
purposes: Irrigation and for power purposes 
on lands irrigated under Provo City System and 
for power rights located on the Factory Race in 
Provo - as designated in tentative decree of 
Fourth District Court." 
Attached to this application under "Explanation" was the 
exact page from the Provo River Decree granting to Provo 
City the 4(c) water. The application was granted by the 
State Engineer. 
Mr. Vlheadon, Director of Provo City's Water Department, 
testified that the 1921 maps and records of Provo City 
indicated that there were 7,360 acres within Provo City in 
1921 and that he had calculated that 5,280 acres were 
amenable to irrigation. By the use of Exhibit 3 (R. 967), 
he set forth in orange diagonal lines the area encompassing 
the 500 acres of city lots (Right 4(b) of Provo River Decree) 
and in green diagonal lines the area irrigated by the 4(c) 
right in 1921 (excluding the First Ward pasture) which he 
estimated to be between 1200 and 1400 acres and probably up 
to 20% greater. (R. 973). 
Exhibit 2 (R. 960) was a transcript of a portion of the 
Provo River Decree covering the testimony of George C. Swan, 
Henry J. 1•7. Goddard, Thomas E. Thompson, T. F. ~Jentz and 
Oscar ltl. Thayre. 
Mr. Swan was Provo City Engineer from 1912 to 1921. 
(R. 981). On page 1580 of that transcript referring to the 
Factory Race Mr. Swan said "it irrigates all of the land to 
the Southwest - - east of the canal with the exception of 
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the First Ward Pasture. lands". He further testified the 
water in the Factory Race was for irrigation purposes. (R. 
987, 983, 984, 985, 986). 
In 1921, Mr. Goddard was 58 years old, had lived in 
Provo all of his life, and was Provo City Commissioner in 
charge of the water department. He stated that the Factory 
Race was used.for irrigation and power. (R. 988 through 
996). 
Mr. Thomas E. Thompson, Provo City vlatermaster since 
1914, testified that the Factory Race water was for irri-
gation. (R. 996-1002). 
Mr. T. F. Wentz, court appointed water commissioner for 
the Provo River from 1913, testified that the Factory Race 
stream was used for irrigation as well as power. (R. 1991, 
1882). 
Mr. Oscar W. Flygare, master mechanic for Knight Woolen 
Mills for 26 years, stated that the Factory Race water was 
used for irrigation. 
Witnesses were called by the Respondent who testified 
that they were familiar with the Factory Race, sometimes 
called the Mill Race, and that all of the 4(c) water was 
used for irrigation from 1921 on and that none was wasted. 
I 
See Earl J. Stubbs (R. 1005 et seq.), Leon Stubbs, (R. 1048 j 
I 
et seq.) Elmer M. Roberts, (R. 1054 et seq.) John H. Goddard,; 
(R. 1135 et seq.) Grant S. Larsen (R. 1119 et seq.) Stanley 
H. Roberts, (R. 1151 et seq.). 
All the Provo City Watermasters prior to 1962 are dead, 
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however, the Provo City records and the testimony of water-
master Robert S. Horwood, who served as such after 1962, were 
to the effect that all of the 16.5 c.f.s. was used for 
irrigation and was not wasted. (R. 1114, et seq.) 
Respondent introduced an affidavit of the Mayor Hansen 
of Provo City, dated September 8, 1925, four (4) years 
after the entry of the Provo River Decree. (Exhibit 9, R. 
1182). The affidavit was in the form of a protest by Provo 
City against an application by Columbia Steel Corporation to 
the State Engineer to appropriate water flowing in the 
Factory Race. In paragraph 3 of that protest, the mayor 
declared that those making power use of the Factory Race had 
done so under license from Provo City for more than thirty-
five (35) years. He affirmed, under oath, that all of the 
water in the Factory Race had been used for irrigation 
purposes during certain times of every year since the licenses 
were granted to the various power users. In paragraph 4, he 
further declared that at those times, none of the water was 
available to the power users, who were thus compelled to 
employ electricity or steam power. rtayor Hansen also affir-
med in paragraph 4 that all of the waters so diverted from 
the Factory Race were necessarily and beneficially used for 
irrigation purposes. 
The plaintiff-respondent introduced a sequence of 
documents from a variety of sources which uniformly imply 
that the 4(c) right of the Provo River Decree was for both 
irrigation and power purposes. (Exhibits 10, 11, 13; R. 
1190, 1191, 1200). 
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Exhibit 10 was a summary of Provo City's water rights 
compiled in 1935 by T. F. Hentz, Provo River Conmissioner 
from about 1941 to 1952. It clearly designated the 4{c) 
right of 16.5 c.f.s. as one to be used for irrigation and 
power during the irrigation season. {R. 1189, Exhibit 10, 
paragraph c.) Exhibit 11 was a similar conpilation for 
1940, al~o prepared by T. F. Wentz. It revealed that Mr. 
Wentz understood the 4{c) right to be one for both power and 
irrigation purposes. {R. 1191.). 
The same view of that right was held by the Provo City 
Engineer in 1946. In a 1946 letter to Hr. Wentz, the 
Engineer directed the Commissioner to satisfy the City's 
contractual obligation to deliver water to one Mrs. Esthma 
Tanner from the 16.5 c.f.s. of paragraph 4{c). {R. 1194). 
In Exhibit 13, the City presented a compilation of 
documents taken from the records of each of the four Provo 
River Commissioners between 1914 and 1969. The documents 
outline the distributions of Provo River water planned by 
the Commissioner. The 1951 plans of Mr. Wentz, commissioner 
from 1914-1952, are on page 2 of Exhibit 13. The water 
distribution plans of Hr. Clark, Commissioner from 1953-
1958, are on page 3. Mr. Wayman, Commissioner from 1959-
1967, made plans for 1962 which are on page 1 of Exhibit 13. 
The 1968 and 1969 plans of Mr. McKellar, Commissioner from 
1968 to 1971, are found on pages 4 and 5 of the Exhibit. 
Collectively and individually, the water distribution pla·s 
through 1968 indicate that Provo City's rights were for both 
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irrigation and power. There was no indication that any of 
the rights were considered non-consumptive power rights 
until 1969, when Mr. McKellar refused to deliver the 16.5 
c.f.s and labelled it a power use in his distribution out-
line. (Page 5 of Exhibit 13). 
It was established beyond doubt that the last mill 
ceased to operate in February, 1930, and that the Factory 
Race water had not been a power source since that time. (R. 
1237, 1238, 1241-1243, 1246, 1249). 
Mr. John A. Zirbes, Provo City Engineer, identified 
Exhibit 18 as an aerial photograph of Provo City, with all 
irrigation ditches marked and labeled. He identified the 
legend attached thereto as a summary of the City's class A 
water rights including the 4(c) right, as the City believes 
them to be. (R. 1259-1260). Mr. Zirbes also identified 
Exhibit 19 as a 1921 map of Provo City. (R. 1270). He 
testified that the area within the city, as bounded on the 
north, east and west by the red line, and on the south by 
Utah Lake, (approximately the bottom of the map) was 4758 
acres. (R. 1270). He further described his calculations 
(as illustrated by Exhibit 20, R. 1275) of the area irri-
gated under the 4(c) right of the Provo River Decree in 
1921. He assumed that the 4758 acres were subject to the 
City's 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c) rights in 1921. From that total 
he subtracted all of the farm acreage subject to paragraph 
4(a) of the Decree, and all of the city lot acreage of 
paragraph 4(b), with a 33% adjustment in the 4(b) acreage to 
allow for the non-irrigation of the areas occupied by homes 
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and buildings. This adjustment operated in favor of the 
appellants' interests in the calculations. (R. 1272-1273). 
Mr. Zirbes then made a further deduction for the 147 acres 
of the First Ward Pasture, which was irrigated under the 
separate right of paragraph 9 of the Provo River Decree. As 
a final deduction, he measured and subtracted 478 acres as 
the ar~a occupied by roads existing in 1921. After 
accounting for all the land occupied by roads and by buildings 
on City lots in 1921, and all the acreage irrigated under 
other decreed rights, (4(a), 4(b) and 9), there remained a 
total of 1407.87 acres unaccounted for by the acreage duties 
for Provo City's irrigation rights under the Provo River 
Decree. (R. 1274). 
INTROCUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
The entire thrust of the appellants' arguments is that 
the remand from this Court did not reverse the former sum-
mary judgment entered by Judge Sorensen. This position is 
basically unsound, for if the remand was not for the purpose 
of finding additional facts and entering conclusions of law 
based on those facts, it was meaningless. Judge Tibbs had 
no alternative but to try the matter anew in order to find 
the necessary facts and to enter conclusions of law accor-
dingly. Once the facts were found, the judgment which was 
entered naturally and legally followed. 
For the appellants to speak of the trial court in the 
following language: "ignoring the balance of the record", 
[of not following] "the remand of this Court while leading 
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counsel all along to believe that it was going to do so," 
and in speaking of the summary judgment, "simply paid it lip 
service in passing and thereafter ignored it," "and even 
more shocking is the Court's conclusion that the Morse 
Decree is not ambiguous", [the court] "let the case get out 
of hand", [which] "justice and fair play demand be rectified 
by this Court on appeal," is to demean that competent Judge. 
Such charges seriously impugn the quality of the appellants' 
claims. It was the appellants who did not want the Court to 
know the facts and who wanted the Court to consider some of 
the facts in a disjointed manner while ignoring facts that 
they found to be inconsistent with their position. It was 
impossible for the Court to sift and sort the facts as the 
appellants wanted, however, a review of all the facts clearly 
discloses that the 4(c) water belonged to the respondent. 
It must be noted that the manner in which the water was 
obtained by appellants from 1969 to 1975 is not above 
reproach. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COHPLIED WITH THE REI1AND OF THIS COURT 
AND DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND JUDGf1ENT. 
Appellants have argued this question four times under 
the titles of Introduction and Points I, II and III, of their 
brief. Respondent believes it to be sufficient to reply to 
all variations of appellants' argument under this single 
point. 
The language of this Court was that the case was "remanded 
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to the District Court with the recommendation that the court 
refer the matter to the State Engineer,etc." It seems clear 
that this Court intended a complete remand to the trial 
court. The above quoted language subsequent to "District 
Court" are only words of recommendation and it is apparent 
that by the use of the term "recommend", that this Court 
intended to leave to the discretion of the trial court the 
procedures necessary to conduct a trial concerning all of 
the issues raised by the pleadings and the implications of 
the remand. 
This Court had previously stated in this same paragraph 
as follows: 
"It would seem to us that it would be helpful 
in making a proper determination of what was 
intended by the language set forth in the 
Provo River Decree if the record contained 
some information as to what use, if any, the 
plaintiff had made of 16.5 second feet of water, 
since its use in the operation of the various 
mills had ceased. It is therefore, ordered 
that this matter be remanded to the District 
Court. * * *" 
Respondent and the trial court rightfully concluded 
that the Court had to make a "proper determination of what 
was intended by the language set forth in the Provo River 
Decree, * * *" For that reason, and giving ordinary con-
struction to the language of remand, the trial court con-
ducted a trial de novo. Any other procedure would have made 
the remand a procedural exercise, if the trial court did not 
have the power to enter findings and judgment consistent 
with the facts established. 
In essence, this was a remand to the district court for 
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further proceedings to determine the factual issues involved. 
Section 962 of Vol. 5, Am.Jur.2d, p. 389, discusses the 
effect of a remand for further proceedings: 
§962. Remand for further proceedings; in 
general. 
If, because of the condition of there-
cord, the court on appeal cannot determine, 
what judgment should justly be rendered, it 
will ordinarily remand the case for further 
proceedings in the trial court. If the record 
does not justify entry or direction of a de-
cree, as where the bill or complaint is con-
sidered insufficient, or the evidence inade-
quate, to support a material issue, no final 
decree is rendered in the appellate court ex-
cept to the extent of setting aside the decree 
in the lower court and requiring further pro-
ceedings to be had therein. 
Although the Supreme Court die not specifically remand 
for a new trial, its decision had the same effect. The 
State Engineer, by direction of the district court, has held 
two "hearings" to determine the factual issues involved. 
The "hearings" actually were "trials" by the State Engineer. 
Needless to say, the State Engineer is not equipped or 
trained to make rulings on evidence, testimony or legal 
arguments. Any findings or decisions made by him which were 
contrary to the interests of the respective parties had to 
be reviewed by the district court. In addition to the scope 
of the referral order, the State Engineer also conducted 
some independent research which he presented to the trial 
court in the form of testir.ony and evidence. This additional 
evidence, of necessity, reauired the Court, on review, to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing (trial) and further, of 
necessity, required the Court to make new findings of fact 
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consistent with such new evidence. The "remand", therefore, 
had to take on the aspects of a new trial. 
Section 963, Vol. 5 of Am.Jur.2d, p. 390, also dis-
cusses the effect of a remand for a new trial: 
On reversing, the appellate court will 
'ordinarily direct a new trial if, under the 
circumstances of the case, this is required 
to attain justice, and usually appellate 
courts will not undertake to render a final 
judgment in a case where questions of fact 
are oresent even though it may have the pow-
er to do so. The necessity for a new trial 
is deemed to exist whenever a jury verdict 
might be different from what it was in a 
trial where errors were committed. Accord-
ingly, if the rights of the parties turn on 
issues of fact as to which the evidence is 
in conflict, the reviewing court in revers-
ing will ordinarily not direct judgment to 
be entered for either of the parties but 
will remand to permit the facts to be re 
solved by the proper fact-finding agency. 
(Emphasis added). 
In regard to the remand, appellants have cited as 
authorities: Allred v. Allred, 12 Utah2d 325, 366 P.2d 478 
(1961); Rule 76(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; LeGrande 
Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 18 Utah2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 
(1966); and Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 207 (Utah, 1976). 
These authorities do not stand for the proposition for which 
they are cited. The substance of these cases is that once 
further proceedings have been ordered, it is the duty of the 
Supreme Court to pass upon all questions of law involved in 
the case presented upon the appeal that are necessary for a 
final determination in the lower court. These cases do not 
support the argument that the trial court thereby has no 
latitute for evidentiary inquiry or remand. 
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The governing principles have been stated by this Court 
in Koch v. J. C. Penney Companv, 534 P.2d .903, 905 (Utah, 
1975) which cites Johnson, supra, and states: 
It should be apparent that there is a dispute 
between the Parties on mutual issues upon-which 
rights depend, so there should be a trial and 
both parties given an opportunity to adduce 
their evidence. The comments in this opinion 
on matters of law have been made because it is 
appropriate to do so when a case is remanded 
for trial. But we do not desire to be under-
stood as indicating any opinion as to how the 
issues of fact should be resolved. (Emphasis 
added). 
See also Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974); 
and Russell v. Park Citv, 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P.2d 1274 
(1973). 
The appellants argue that the trial court had no autho-
rity at all to nake findings contrary to the previous Summary 
Judgment. If there were substance to this argument, then 
the remand would have been a ridiculous imposition on the 
trial court and of no assistance to the Supreme Court. It 
is respectfully submitted that there is no merit to appellants' 
Point I. 
It should also be noted that upon remand, Judge Soren-
son, before he recused himself, interpreted the language of 
the Supreme Court to mean that he would allow an evidentiary 
trial, vis a vis, a legal argument based on motion for 
Summary Judgment. Judge Sorenson conducted a pre-trial 
conference, and permitted extensive argument accompanied by 
written briefs. After full consideration, he allowed the 
respondent to amend its complaint (R. 287,288) and to allege 
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new matters,making a repeat judgment within the framework of 
the original pleadings impossible. How was Judge Tibbs to 
dispose of these new pleadin?s by both the appellants and 
respondent except by conducting a trial de novo? Appellants 
somehow find Judge Sorenson's original judgment sacrosanct, 
but his decision after remand not worth mentioning. It is, 
however, important to note that they do not appeal from 
Judge Sorenson's ruling allowing the amended complaint. 
In Point III, appellants go on to contend that the 
trial court's decision was unsupported by competent evidence, 
Such a representation to this court is incredible. The 
course of appellants' argument, however, is not that there 
was not evidence to support the ~rial Court's findings but, 
rather, that the trial court erred in taking evidence in 
areas beyond what the appellants interpret to be the para-
meters of the Supreme Court's remand. This again, is 
the same argument that the respondent has heretofore twice 
addressed. 
To the extent that there seems to be any specificity to 
this segment of appellants' appeal, we shall address such 
claimed error as it is mentioned, particularly the allega-
tions concerning Findings of Fact 12, 15 and 16. 
Amended Finding ll: 
12. From 1921 through August of 1969, all of 
the Provo River Commissioners delivered Provo 
City's riqhts under Paragraphs 4(a), (b) and 
(c) as separate and distinct rights and treated 
each right as being useable for irrigation pur-
poses. 
This finding is irrefutable. There is no evidence to 
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the contrary. 
Appellants seem to think that because there were times 
when there was not sufficient water in the river to fulfill 
all of Provo's 4(a), (b) and (c) rights, that Provo City 
did not receive its 4(c) water. The argument seems to imply 
that the Provo River Commissioner would first fill the 4(a) 
and 4(b) rights and, if there were anything left, he would 
apply it to 4(c). This is not the fact. (R. 751). If, for 
example, in the vernacular of the water men, the river was 
an 80% river, then Provo would receive 80% of each of its 
4(a), (b), and (c) rights. 
The respondent asks this Court to consider the language 
of this finding. How the appellants, within the plain 
syntax of paragraph 12, can conclude that such finding is in 
error 92.5% of the time, etc. is a mystery to the respondent 
and defies reply. It is simply a false syllogism and as 
such cannot be answered except to say it is logically un-
sound and contrary to the evidence at trial. 
The testimony of Mr. Clark and all previous water corn-
missioners from 1927 through August of 1969 was that the 
4(c) water was for irrigation and was delivered accordingly. 
(R. 757, 1086, 1108). There is absolutely no variance 
between fact and Amended Finding No. 12. 
Amended Findina 12: 
15. During the years from 1921 to 1969, all of 
the water delivered to Provo City by the Provo 
River Commissioners was beneficially used and 
there was no water wasted. 
The court should realize that this case was tried 50 
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years after the fact and, consequently, this testimony was 
elicited from both elderly people who were familiar with the 
stream flow from 1921 (R. 1005-1135), augmented by present 
users (R. 1048, 1149). The appellants describe the knowled~ 
of such users as Stubbs (R. 1005), Goddard (R. 1135), and 
Roberts (R. 1151) as casual observations. 
Compare these casual observations with what the appellants 
state are actual measurements. The measurements referred to 
on page 32 of their brief (R. 880-887) were simply weir 
measurements made in the southwest part of Provo by Robert 
White, an engineer of the Bureau of Reclamation. All he 
knew was what water was in the ditch at a given time. He 
made no effort to determine its source. Consider the 
following testimony by Mr. White: 
R. 880, L. 13 to L. 22 
Q, How much of the water that you've measured 
in those ditches or in those canals were return 
flow? 
A. I have not made a study to determine how 
much is return flow. 
Q. You say there was return water in the 
ditches? 
A. There is. 
Q. By that term, you and I both understand 
that that's water that's once been used for 
irrigation purposes, do we not? 
1\. Yes. 
R. 895 L. 4 to R. 896 L. 21 
Q. Why do you put numbers on the ditches 
different than the street numbers? 
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A. When I first started out there, I noticed 
in my notes the other day, I called it lOth 
West. For some reason I changed it to 11th 
Uest, but I don't know why. 
Q. Can you tell us, in your measurements, how 
much of the water that you measured was run-off 
water frorn Rock Canyon? 
A. No, I can't. 
Q. Tell us how much was run-off from Slate 
Canyon? 
A. Slate Canyon is south of the city, and I 
did not get into those ditches. 
Q. Can you tell us how much was run-off water 
from Tirnp canal? 
A. No, I can't. 
Q. Or from the Upper East Union Canal? 
A. No. 
Q. Can you tell us how much of that water 
entered the system because it was subsurface 
water, just percolated up? 
A. No. 
Q. Can you tell us how much of that water 
was well flow water? 
A. No. 
Q. There were wells out there above your 
measuring devices, were there not? 
A. Yes, the purpose of this study was to 
determine the in-flow to Provo Bay and these 
are the flows that I found. 
Q. Did you determine how much of that water 
was soring water? 
A. No. 
Q. There were springs, weren't there, in that 
area - - in everyone of the areas that you 
measured, there were springs? 
A. I haven't observed springs myself. 
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Q. Now, when you say that the water in the 
Mill race was high in the wintertime, is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Low in the summertime? 
A.. Yes. 
Q. Well, that just meant that whoever was 
opening the gates was running the flood water 
down the Mill race; isn't that true? 
A. That could have been. 
The trial court was ~Tell advised to take such "casual 
observations" against the conclusions of such "scientific" 
studies. 
Amended Finding 16: 
16. The State Engineer's report, which has 
been submitted to the Court, is erroneous as 
to the date when the Mills ceased operation. 
The State Engineer's report used the early 
1940's as the date when the Mills ceased oper-
ation while evidence presented at trial clearly 
established the date as 1931; consequently, 
the Court does not find a trend in the usage 
of water in the Provo City system as mentioned 
by the State Engineer in his report. 
Somehow appellants think the respondent is responsible 
for one of the State Engineer's major mistakes. Most gal-
ling is the statement (p. 37 of Brief) that "he was led in~ 
error by Provo City withholding evidence from him". This 
assertion is totally untrue. At the time the engineer was 
conducting his investigation, this information was unknown 
to the respondent. ~his was a material area that the 
engineer was assigned to investigate by Judge Sorensen and 
into which area this court recommended that he inquire. The 
respondent was under no duty to ascertain or present these 
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facts. A superficial reading of his report would cause a 
long time resident of Provo to note the obvious mistake. 
After the inquiry, the respondent made an effort to find the 
true facts which could have been found by anyone willing to 
conduct a simple inquiry. The facts were equally available 
to anyone. To say that the respondent led the engineer into 
error by not doing his work for hin is unwarranted. 
Be that as it may, appellants admit that the engineer 
was off in his facts by over ten years, making Finding 16 
absolutely true. 
The appellants' observations concerning Findings 17 and 
19 are immaterial to their appeal and, consequently, will 
not be argued. The argument made to Finding 20 is identi-
cal to their argument to Finding 16 and has been answered. 
Suffice it to say that, in respect to each finding of 
fact complained of, there was a plethora of believable 
proof. In the case of Bullock v. Hanks, 22 U.2d 308, 452 
P.2d 866 (1969), a case involving this exact issue, this 
Court expressly held that a trial de novo under U.C.A. 
§73-3-15 is equitable in nature and that "the findings of 
the court will be disturbed only if the evidence clearly 
preponderates against them". (452 P.2d at 868, n. 2). This 
rule is clearly established in all areas of Utah law. See 
e.g. Shields v. Dry Creek Irrigation Company, 8 U.2d 55, 61, 
328 P.2d 175 (1958). The respondent believes that the 
appellants have failed to show that the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the findings. 
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POINT II 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 18 IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND IS NOT BARRED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF RES ADJUDICATA, 
Contrary to appellants' assertion in Point IV of their 
brief, there was ample evidence that Provo City, for all of 
the time it was taking 4(c) water and before, irrigated 
substantially in excess of 2558.51 acres. The evidence 
presented by the testimony of Wheadon (R. 967), the transcript 
of Goddard, Swan, Thompson and Hentz (Ex. 2), Earl Stubbs, 
(R. 1005) Leon Stubbs (R. 1060) Worwood (R. 1114), Goddard 
(R. 1135) Larsen (R. 1149) Roberts (R. 1158) Zirbes (R. 
1270) and Exhibits 3, 18 and 19, all clearly demonstrate 
that Provo City in 1921 had at least 4133 acres under 
irrigation in addition to the First Ward Pasture. (Exhibit 
20). Appellants simply refuse to allow that the abundant 
evidence submitted by the respondent is believable, however, 
the trial court obviously found it considerably more reliable 
than that offered by the appellants. The court had the 
absolute right to weigh all of the evidence in accordance 
with its significance and to consider the testimony of the 
individual lay witnesses in conjunction, for example, with 
the testimony of Wheadon and Zirbes. 
Appellants' arguments seem to be that their evidence is 
competent while the respondent offered "no competent" evidence, 
In reply, we state that the evidence offered by the respon-
dent was at least of equal quality and certainly of greater 
quantity than that of the appellants. 
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Appellants have stated their version of the facts and 
their interpretation of their own evidence as if there were 
no facts to the contrary, and rather, in the face of 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It seems beyond 
argument that the trial court may determine which evidence 
it cares to believe and that decision should be overturned 
only upon a showing of clear error. 
POINT III 
THE PROVO RIVER DECREE, RE: 4(a), 4(b) AND 4(c) WATER 
IS NOT AHBIGUOUS. 
The court, in his pronouncement from the bench on 
December 11, 1975, said: "The Court concluded that the 
Horse Decree is not ambiguous and that Provo City is entitled 
to A, B, and C, rights for irrigation purposes even though 
no acreage or duty figures are set forth on the C right". 
The basis for the court's conclusion was that, after hearing 
all the facts, he understood the reason that Judge Morse did 
not attach a duty to the 4(c) right. When one understands 
the circumstances, it is clear that Judge Morse knew what he 
was doing. 
It seems apparent that the primary reason for not 
attaching a duty to the 4(c) water is that it had to irrigate 
the area contiguous to the shore of Utah Lake, which in 1921 
was subject to major annual fluctuations. At times there 
would be hundreds of acres more of accretion land to be 
irrigated, and at times of high water, hundreds of acres 
less. Consequently, it would have been impossible to attach 
-33-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an acreage duty to such water. 
Judge Morse was an experienced trial judge. There were 
at least ~ lawyers who partici~ated in the trial during the 
many years in which evidence was taken. The record clearly 
demonstrated that the trial was conducted with skill and to 
professional standards. 
After the trial, there were motions to amend the findings, 
including one by Provo City to increase the duty on the 
water awarded under 4(a) and 4(b) of the Decree. It is 
evident that the Findings and Decree were scrutinized by 
Court and counsel with infinite care. It is inconceivable 
that the Court and counsel in 1921 did not understand the 
meaning of Provision 4(c) or even more incredible, in-
advertently and by mistake used these words in writing the 
Decree: 
"during the irrigation season" * * * "Which 
water has been heretofore been used for irri-
gation purposes by the City * * *" 
The defendants in this case would have the Court believe 
that the reference to irrigation rights as set forth in 
Findings of Fact Nos. 57 and 58 was just a coincidental 
compounding of the error and mistake made by Judge Morse in 
Provision 4(c) of the Decree. 
At the time of the Decree, all the parties recognized 
that the 16.5 c.f.s. (4(c) water) was owned by Provo City 
for irrigation purposes. There was no dispute. 7his is why 
they conceded and the Court adjudged the water to be Provo 
City's for the purposes set forth in the Decree. Those 
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upstream parties included the present defendants, Provo 
Reservoir Hater Users Cor.1pany, and the predecessors in 
interest of the Provo River Water Users Association. The 
principle of res adjudicata should bar the defendants from 
now disputing such ancient fact. See 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments 
§533, §534. It was also understood by the downstream users 
that once Provo City took that 16.5 c.f.s. of water into 
it's system, they had no clain upon it and Provo City was 
not obliged in any way to return that water to the river. 
The City took it into it's system for consumptive and bene-
ficial use. Those are the simple facts, otherwise the 
language of the Decree would be meaningless. 
POINT IV 
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION 11AKES THE 
ACTUAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DECREE FOR FIFTY YEARS RES 
ADJUDICATA AND THE APPELLANTS BY REASON OF THEIR CONDUCT ARE 
NOW ESTOPPED FRDr! DENYING THE TH!E HONORED INTERPRETATION. 
It is a firmly established principal of law that if a 
decree or judgment becomes the subject of dispute due to 
ambiguity or misinterpretation, the Courts will look to the 
common interpretation that the parties have recognized in 
the past. If one of the parties to a decree acquiesces to a 
particular interpretation for many years, he is not per-
nitted to later complain of a different interpretation. 
This is known as the doctrine of practical construction. 
(See Annotation, 120 1\.L.P. 862). 
The sane problem of the interPretation of a decree has 
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developed in this case. The Morse Decree, entered in 1921, 
has now become a subject of dispute. The defendants claim 
that the water awarded under naragraph 4(c) of the Morse 
Decree cannot be used for irrigation purposes. They first 
discovered this new interpretation in 1969, some 49 years 
after the Decree was entered. 
At ,this date, there are no witnesses alive that know of 
their own personal knowledge the facts giving rise to the 
Morse Decree. All of the prior Provo City water masters 
have passed away and only one prior Provo River Commissioner 
is presently alive. It would seem that the defendants are 
guilty of laches in the extreme. They should not now be 
able to change the interpretation of a decree to which they 
have acquiesced for almost fifty years~ 
All of the defendants have had notice of the amounts of 
water claimed and used by Provo City. The rule of practical 
construction is stated in Partten v. First National Bank & 
Trust Comoanv, et al., 283 N.l•1. 403 (1938), where a probate 
court decree entered pursuant to a District Court Judgment 
did not in fact conform to the judgment of the District 
Court. An ambiguity arose because one of the clauses had 
been omitted. The Court stated: 
The trustee accepted that construction as 
the correct one and acted under it without 
challenge or question for at least 12 
years in the performance of its duties. 
While there might be strong reasons for 
holding that the plaintiffs are estopped to 
question that construction of the judg~ent, 
because of the position taken by the bene-
ficiaries on the notion to amend, it is 
clear beyond dispute that the parties have 
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solemnly adopted that construction of the 
probate decree and acted under it until the 
instant action was beaun. The construction 
which the oarties hav~ placed uoon a judg-
ment or decree ordinarily will not be changed 
except for strong re=sons. 
The same principle has been applied to the determination 
of water rights. In La Luz Co~munity Ditch Co. v •. Town of 
Alamogordo, 34 N.M. 127, 279 P. 72 (1929), plaintiffs 
brought suit for declaratory judgment of their rights under 
an 1898 decree. The defendants had waited approximately 30 
years before disputing the plaintiff's claim to a .89 c.f.s. 
water right that had been continuously delivered to the 
plaintiff. The Court upheld the historical or "practical 
construction" of the Decree because of the defendant's 
acquiescence over the years. In respect to this principle, 
the Court stated at page 77: 
Appellant argues that, as the decree of 
1898 is a judgment by consent, it is to be 
regarded as a contract between the parties, 
and must be construed as any other contract, 
quoting from 34 C.J., p. 133 to the effect 
that its operation and effect must be gath-
ered from the terms used in the agreement, 
and should not be extended beyond the clear 
import of such terms, etc. 
This does not helP appellant, because, 
while the rule he cites is well recognized, 
there is another one equally well established 
to the effect that: "If a contract is ambi-
guous in meaning, the practical construction 
put upon it by the parties thereto, is of 
great weight, even though the contract is in 
writing, and ordinarily, is controlling, at 
least if such Practical construction has 
lasted for a l;na period of time." Page on 
the Law of Contr~c~s, §2034. 
~e Hre in accorj with the rule thus 
stated * * * 
The court invoked the rule of Practical 
construction placed by the rarties in interest 
u~on doubtful or aMcigous terms in a contract, 
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and concluded: "That the construction which 
the owners of the power for years placed upon 
the terms of their grants, it arpearing that 
such construction is reasonable and definite, 
should and must prevail." (emphasis added) 
The principal of estoppel should also be considered in 
determining the interpretation of the Decree (La Luz Communi~ 1 
Ditch, supra, page 78). The City of Provo has developed 
over the years with the impression that its decreed rights 
were secure and could be used to meet future needs. To help 
understand the City's claim to the waters awarded under 
paragraph 4(c), reference should be made to paragraph 58(c) 
of the Findings of Fact which corresponds substantially to 
paragraph 4(c) of the Decree. 
(c) That said defendant Provo City, during 
the irrigation season of each and every 
year, is the owner of the right to the use 
of 16.5 c.f.s of water. Which water has 
heretofore been used for irrigation purposes. 
* * * (emphasis added). 
If the respondent had understood that it did not own 
the water and that it could not use the water for further 
expansion, it would have purchased more water when Deer 
Creek Reservoir was built or would have acquired water 
rights from other sources to supplement the present supply. 
By not raising their objections forty (40) years ago when 
the mills stopped, the defendants are now estopped from tryi~ 
to deprive Provo City of its water. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent does not dispute any of the authorities 
cited by the appellants except to state that, where they are 
cited for specific propositions, t~ey are miscited and the 
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true holding of the case is different, as we have pointed 
out. Where appellants use authorities for general pro-
positions, the respondent has had no dispute with the pro-
position. In short, in spite of the size of the record and 
the significance of the issues, this is a case in which the 
appellants have not been able to cite any case in point for 
their contentions. 
In respect to the facts, the appellants have attempted 
to develop a set of "facts" which they could argue. They 
did so by dividing their "facts" into categories, two of 
which, B and C, were not facts before the Trial Court. It 
was on these "facts" that appellants have attempted to build 
their case on appeal. The true facts, those elicited from 
witnesses and evidence submitted to the trial court, the 
appellants have, in large, chosen to ignore. 
Respondents submit that the Trial Court had before it 
ample evidence in support of each and every finding it made. 
Further, the judgment entered was well within the purview of 
the remand and is not outside the law. Such a conclusion 
is also supported by the doctrines of res adjudicata and 
practical construction. 
Respectfully submitted this /£ :l.f day of Ajt-1/ , 
1977. 
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